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Changing causes of the rocketing TARGET2 accounts imbalances in the Eurosystem and the balance of payments of Germany

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
Director of research at IESEG School of Management


The whole list of TARGET2 related liabilities of the National Central Banks of the Eurosystem can be estimated for April 2012.

Estimates of the TARGET2 related claims or liabilities of The NCBs of the Eurosystem in April	
2012 Billions €	

	Claims	Liabilities	
Bundesbank	644	303	Banco de España
Central Bank of Luxembourg	120	279	Banca d'Italia
Nederlandsche Bank	136	99	Central Bank of Ireland
Bank of Finland	63	98	Bank of Greece
Bank of Estonia	1	69	Banco do Portugal
		35	Oesterreichische Nationalbank
		35	National Bank of Belgium
		26	Bank of France
		9	National Bank of Slovakia
		8	Central Bank of Cyprus
		5	Bank of Slovenia
		1	Central Bank of Malta
		-3	ECB and errors
	964	964	

A few central banks have already published their data for May. The TARGET2 related claims of the Bundesbank on the rest of the Eurosystem have reached 698 billion € in May 2012! In counterpart the Target2 related liabilities of the Bank of Spain have reached 345 Billion €, and those of the Bank of Italia have also surged.





The causes of the surge of the TARGET2 claims of the Bundesbank

To explain the surge of the TARGET2-related claims of the Bundesbank on the Eurosystem, the usual narrative tells that there are huge deposit flights out of the euro zone's distressed countries' banks, and that the withdrew funds are being reinvested on deposit accounts in German banks. However, the data of the German balance of payments show that there has not been any significant increase of foreign deposits in German banks since 2008, apart from a slight inflow in 2012.

Main inflows of funds		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012 First quarter
	Current account	153633	140558	150668	147653	40926
	Increase of the stock of foreign loans to German monetary financial institutions			74023		230482
	Decrease of the stock of loans of German monetary financial institutions to the rest of the world		176638	138588	44248	
	Increase of the stock of foreign loans to the German government	6235		94043	17416	
	Increase of the stock of German bonds and notes held by Foreign investors	19498		57767	48711	12655
	Decrease of the stock of loans of the German general government to foreign borrowers	715				
	Increase of foreign deposits in German banks			2339		19437
Main outflows of funds						
Tunub	German investment in foreign bonds and notes	28008	83438	156239	22285	35539
	Decrease of the stock of foreign loans to German monetary financial institutions	56624	85364		93324	
	Increase of the stock of loans of German monetary financial institutions to the rest of the world	73616				32224
	Increase of Target2 claims of the Deutsche Bundesbank	44600	61373	147618	137757	152281
	Decrease of the stock of foreign loans to the German government		5287			32988
	Increase of bank deposits of German companies and households in the rest of the world	15418	17609	44472	9259	23788
	Decrease of the stock of German bonds and notes held by Foreign investors		70113			
	German net direct investment abroad	44134	36881	47161	10047	23365
	Increase of the stock of loans of the German general government to foreign borrowers		2426	53080	4136	208
	Decrease of foreign deposits in German banks	2860	30543		3509	
Other net outflows of funds						
		-85894	-75838	66519	-22289	-16330

Inflows and outflows of funds in the balance of payments of Germany, € Millions

An obvious accounting identity implies that the total inflows of funds in Germany must be equal to the total outflows of funds, which include the increase of the TARGET2-related claims of the Bundesbank on the rest of the Eurosystem. Therefore, during any period of time, an increase of the claims of the Deutsche Bundesbank on the Eurosystem must result from increases in inflows of funds that are not compensated by corresponding increases in outflows of funds, or by decreases in outflows of funds that are not compensated by corresponding decreases in inflows of funds.

The German balance of payments therefore shows that the main driving factors of the surge of The TARGET2-related claims of the Bundesbank on the rest of the Eurosystem have been:

- A decrease of the stock of loans of German monetary financial institutions to the rest of the world in 2009, 2010 and 2011: German banks obviously decided not to renew a big part of the loans that had been awarded to foreign borrowers and that arrived at maturity, and these banks did not grant many new loans to foreign borrowers
- An increase of the stock of foreign loans to German monetary financial institutions in 2012, showing that the funds corresponding to the huge deposit flights out of distressed countries have been partly reinvested in German banks, but in the form of loans rather than deposits

Among the other driving factors, there has been a sharp decrease of the German investment in foreign bonds and notes in 2011, an increase of the stock of German bonds and notes held by Foreign investors in 2010 and 2011.

Deposit flights out of the banks of Spain

The following graphs show that domestic and foreign deposit withdrawals have been recently accelerating in Spain

