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Speaker: Marleen WILLKENS Date and Location – Thursday December 8th 2022 from 14:30 to 16:0<\/strong>0 —————————————–<\/p>\n We explore whether the use of a high-reputation auditor mitigates horizontal agency costs of tax avoidance associated with ownership conflicts in private firms. Using a high-reputation auditor may impact tax avoidance as follows. First, the auditor\u2019s own reputation concerns limit client tax avoidance. Second, a high-reputation auditor also verifies information and increases transparency for outside investors. Hence, its use serves as a credible monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency costs. Ceteris paribus, this should increase tax avoidance among firms with a high-reputation auditor and which are subject to horizontal agency conflicts. Using a unique sample of Norwegian private firms from 2000 to 2016 with detailed ownership information, we provide novel evidence that the use of a high-reputation auditor mitigates horizontal agency costs of tax avoidance. These findings are robust over time and firm size and we further provide evidence suggesting that the mitigating e\u21b5ect of a highreputation auditor on tax avoidance is likely causal.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n JEL classification:<\/strong> G32, M42 <\/em>
\n<\/strong>KU Leuven
\nCo-authored by Michael KISSER and John Christian LANGLI
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\nin Paris campus (PR13) and on Zoom<\/strong><\/p>\nABSTRACT<\/h2>\n
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\nKeywords:<\/strong> Tax avoidance, horizontal agency costs, audit quality, private firms<\/em><\/p>\n