![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.ieseg.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/09\/Bandeaux-events-seminaire-recherche.jpg\")
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Speaker: Aur\u00e9lien BAILLON Date and Location – Thursday March 23rd 2023 from 14:00 to 15:0<\/strong>0 —————————————–<\/p>\n
\n<\/strong>EM Lyon<\/i><\/p>\n
\nin Lille campus (R217) and on Zoom<\/strong><\/p>\nABSTRACT<\/h2>\n
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For some questions, such as what the best policy to address a problem is, it is uncertain if the answer will ever be known. Asking experts yields two practical problems: how can their truth-telling be incentivized if the correct answer is unknowable? And if experts disagree, who should be trusted? This paper solves both problems simultaneously. Experts decide whether to endorse a statement and trade an asset whose value depends on the endorsement rate. The respective payoffs of buyers and sellers indicate whom to trust. We demonstrate theoretically and illustrate empirically that \u201cfollowing the money” outperforms selecting the majority opinion.<\/p>\n