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Speaker: Yiming QIAN Date and Location – Wednesday June 14th 2023 from 14:00 to 15:3<\/strong>0 —————————————–<\/p>\n
\n<\/strong>University of Connecticut<\/p>\n
\nin Paris campus (PR14) and on Zoom<\/strong><\/p>\nABSTRACT<\/h2>\n
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Beginning in 2012, private equity (PE) fund advisers (i.e., general partners, or GPs) must register with the SEC and disclose information regarding misconduct. We find that the disclosure of misconduct reduces GPs\u2019 ability to raise future funds. Among different types of investors (i.e., limited partners, or LPs), public pension funds are most averse to misconduct disclosure. Further, misconduct disclosure reduces the likelihood that a fund\u2019s existing investors commit capital to a GP\u2019s subsequent PE funds, suggesting that the public disclosure of misconduct deters both current and new investors. We find that LPs are averse to misconduct disclosure because of reputation concerns. We also find evidence that misconduct is related to GP crash risk. This study sheds light on the effects of mandatory disclosure in the lightly regulated PE market, which is drawing increasing scrutiny as PE\u2019s economic importance grows. Our findings also contribute to the growing literature on the economics of misconduct.<\/p>\n