

What we pay in the shadow: Labor tax evasion, minimum wage hike and employment *

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Abstract

This paper analyzes a large and biting minimum wage hike in a context of prevalent labor tax evasion. We examine a diffuse type of labor tax evasion: envelope wage, i.e., an unreported cash-in-hand complement to the official wage. Exploiting a combination of administrative and survey data, we propose a methodology to disentangle compliant firms from tax evading ones and assess the validity of the approach with several checks. We then study firm-level employment response to the minimum wage hike conditional on tax compliance. Contrary to compliant firms, firms engaged in labor tax evasion are insensitive to the minimum wage shock. Our results suggest that firms use wage underreporting as a margin to absorb the minimum wage shock. Increasing minimum wage contributes to tax rules enforcement by pushing tax-evading firms to convert part of the envelope into legal wage. This however comes at the cost of negative employment consequences for compliant firms.

Keywords: Minimum wage, employment, tax evasion

JEL: J08, H26, E26

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1 Introduction


How do firms adjust to minimum wage shocks? The vast literature studying the employment effect of minimum wage hikes remains largely inconclusive. Within this literature, the few papers examining firm-level employment response describe relatively small employment effects (Machin et al., 2003; Mayneris et al., 2018; Harasztosi and Lindner, 2019). A possible explanation is that firms may use margins other than employment to absorb the shock such as price pass-through (Harasztosi and Lindner, 2019; Renkin et al., 2020; Allegretto and Reich, 2018), profits (Draca et al., 2011; Harasztosi and Lindner, 2019; Bell and Machin, 2018; Drucker et al., 2019) but also compliance (Clemens and Strain, 2020).

This paper studies firm-level employment effects of a minimum wage hike conditional on labor tax evasion. We focus on a sequence of two minimum wage hikes in Latvia in 2014 and 2015, representing altogether a 26% increase of the nominal minimum wage and affecting about 20% of the workforce. We exploit a unique combination of administrative and survey data structured around a matched employer-employee dataset covering the whole population of employees at a monthly frequency throughout the 2011-2017 period.

The interactions between minimum wage policy and labor tax evasion remain largely unknown. We study a diffuse type of labor tax evasion: *envelope wage*, i.e., an unreported cash-in-hand complement to the official wage. Income underreporting is a widespread phenomenon documented in a large set of countries (e.g., Gorodnichenko et al., 2009 in Russia, Putniņš and Sauka, 2015 in the Baltic States, Tonin, 2011 in Hungary, Pelek and Uysal, 2018 in Turkey, Perry et al., 2007 in Argentina but also Hurst et al., 2014 for self-employed in the US). In this setup, minimum wage policy can become a fiscal policy tool: a minimum wage hike pushes firms to convert part of the envelope into official wage to comply with the new level, so that they remain under the tax authorities' radar. From an employment perspective, unreported wage may hence act as a buffer to absorb minimum wage shocks (Tonin, 2011). At the same time, not all firms are tax-evaders, and some firms genuinely pay their employees at the minimum wage. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether compliant and tax-evading firms do exhibit a different reaction in terms of employment following a minimum wage hike.

Envelope wage is a major issue in the Latvian labor market. More than one in ten employees in Latvia admitted to have received envelope wage (Eurobarometer, 2014). Putniņš and Sauka (2015) estimate that 34% of total wages in Latvia are paid in envelope. Jascisens and Zasova (2021) provide evidence of a sharp increase in pregnant women’s wage during the time period taken into account to calculate parental benefits, which they interpret as a shift from envelope to official wage. To illustrate the prevalence of this issue, figure 1 displays the wage distribution in January 2013. The dashed line at EUR 285 represents the minimum wage in place in 2013 (gross). As the magnitude of the spike is linked to the prevalence of underreporting (Tonin, 2013), this depicts a clear picture of the importance of the issue. This figure also highlights how hard is the minimum wage hike biting. Increasing from 285 to 320 euro in 2014 and then to 360 in 2015, more than 20% of the workforce is affected.

Figure 1: WAGE DISTRIBUTION IN LATVIA (JANUARY 2013)



NOTE: the dashed line indicate the minimum wage in 2013 (gross).

Our empirical analysis is composed of three main steps. First, we propose a methodology to classify firms between compliant and tax-evading ones using machine

learning. We focus on firms with at least six employees to ensure that all firms operate in a similar tax environment.¹ Second, we implement a series of checks to ensure the validity of our classification. Third, equipped with a binary indicator for tax evasion, we estimate firm-level relationship between the fraction of affected workers prior to the minimum wage hike and the percentage change in employment in the aftermath of the reform conditional on labor tax compliance.

Detecting firms involved in envelope wage payments is not a trivial task. The literature on wage underreporting is mostly interested in estimating the thickness of the envelope at the employee level rather than identifying tax-evading firms. When it does so, it is usually at the aggregate level, with the use of survey data (see for instance Putniņš and Sauka, 2015). We use supervised machine learning techniques to construct a firm-level classification of Latvian firms. It relies on three key ingredients: i) a classification algorithm; ii) firm-level information to use as predictors and iii) a sample of firms for which we know the "true" type to train the algorithm.

For the algorithm, we apply gradient boosting decision trees (Friedman, 2001; Chen and Guestrin, 2016). Gradient boosting is an ensemble technique widely used for its predictive performance and its ability to capture nonlinearities. The general idea is to add new models to the ensemble sequentially. At each iteration, a new weak, base-learner tree is trained with respect to the error of the whole ensemble learned so far.² Regarding predictors, we follow a vast literature in accounting and computer science focusing on fraud detection and use information from firms' balance sheets (Beneish, 1999; Cecchini et al., 2010; West and Bhattacharya, 2016). This literature usually aims at spotting public firms that have been convicted of fraud. As any financial manipulation, income underreporting is likely to generate artefacts in the balance sheet.

The main difficulty stems in the obtention of a sample of firms for which we know whether they are tax-evading or compliant. As tax evasion is not directly observable, we construct a sample based on (strong) assumptions. We consider that firms owned

¹Firms employing five or less workers and with turnover below a defined threshold are eligible for a special micro enterprise tax scheme. Micro enterprise tax is levied on firms' turnover and does not directly depend on employees' wages. Hence micro enterprises have different reporting incentives and are therefore excluded from our analysis.

²See Athey and Imbens (2019) for a brief introduction to the method for economists.

by a Nordic company are compliant. DeBacker et al. (2015) provide strong evidence that tax morale culture is imported in foreign-owned firms. Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are considered as benchmarks for legal compliance and regularly top rankings such as the Corruption Perception Index. For the subsample of labor tax-evading firms, we use firms that are paying a "suspiciously low wage" to their employees. In practice, we link the matched employer-employee dataset to several waves of the Labor Force Survey (LFS). This allows us to estimate a wage equation for a subsample of employees, regressing the administrative wage with a large amount of individual characteristics. We are then able to track in which firms employees at the bottom of the residuals distribution work (typically, employees predicted to receive a fairly high wage but actually paid at the minimum wage), and consider these firms as tax-evaders.

Applying the model to the whole population of firms, we estimate that 37% of the companies in our sample, covering 24% of the employees, are labor tax-evaders over the 2011-2013 period. This classification is broadly consistent with aggregate and survey estimates. In particular, smaller firms are more likely to underreport and construction is one of the most affected sectors, as documented by Putniņš and Sauka (2015).

The classification is admittedly based on strong assumptions. In the second stage of the analysis, we perform three main checks to validate the relevance of our classification. First, comparing the *stated* wage in LFS to the *administrative* wage, we observe that employees of firms classified as tax-evading declare on average a higher wage in the survey. This is not the case for employees of compliant firms. Second, thanks to the matched employer-employee data, we can track individuals across firms. The *administrative* wage of an individual switching from a tax-evading to a compliant firm on average greatly improves, whereas it decreases for an individual switching from a compliant to a tax-evading firm. Third, we implement a consumption-based underreporting analysis *à la* Pissarides and Weber (1989). The main idea of this approach is to compare food expenditures of a group of households suspected of income underreporting to a reference group considered to be tax-compliant. Provided that there is no incentives to misreport food consumption, a systematic difference in propensity to food consumption between the two groups can be interpreted as wage underreporting. We match our firm classification to the respondents of the Household

Budget Survey (HBS). Using households where the head is a public sector employee (who presumably cannot engage in wage underreporting) as the reference group, we do not find any sign of underreporting for household lead by an employee of a compliant firm. We however estimate that households lead by an individual working in a tax-evading firm underreport about 35% of their total income.

In a third stage, we study the impact of the minimum wage hike on firm-level employment. Following Machin et al. (2003) and Harasztosi and Lindner (2019), we estimate the relationship between the share of workers affected by the hike and the percentage change in employment between a post-reform period t and a pre-reform reference period. The interaction between the bite of the minimum wage increase and the tax-evasion indicator allows to investigate whether tax-evading firms have a different reaction than compliant firms. We find that tax-evading firms remained largely unaffected by the hike, the level of exposure to the minimum wage hike not being significantly related to changes in employment. At the same time, we find that a year after the reform compliant firms employing only minimum wage workers had a 12% lower employment growth than compliant firms with no workers affected by the policy. This negative employment effect is driven by both the extensive (firm closure) and the intensive margins (hiring/firing decisions). These results hold for alternative measures of firm-level treatment intensity.

The difference in firm-reaction persists over time: three years after the minimum wage hike, employment in tax evading firms remains insensitive to their initial level of exposure to the minimum wage shock whereas employment growth in exposed compliant firms incurs a large decrease. At the same time, the average income increases for exposed firms irrespective of their type, as do the average income tax and social security contributions per employee collected. The minimum wage was de facto implemented, supporting the envelope wage conversion mechanism.

A trade-off emerges for policy-makers in a context of widespread labor tax evasion: increasing the minimum wage has a positive effect on tax rules enforcement, contributing to provide employees with social protections. This however comes at the cost of negatively affecting tax compliant firms exposed to this hike.

This paper contributes to the vast literature on employment effects of the min-

imum wage in several ways. First, many papers rely on relatively small minimum wage shocks. To identify the effect of a minimum wage hike, both the magnitude of the raise and the intensity of the bite must be considered. In the Latvian case, the minimum wage episode in consideration is sizeable (26% nominal increase between 2013 and 2015), uniform across sectors, and impacts a large fraction of the workforce. This allows us to study firm reactions without having to focus on a specific sector that can lead to sample selection issues (Manning, 2021).

Second, the standard specification relates the employment rate (computed from survey data) in a state/region s at time t to the minimum wage, exploiting minimum wage heterogeneity across states. Cross-state policy variation can however be correlated with shocks that also affect employment outcomes, and determining a valid control group is not a trivial task (Allegretto et al., 2011; Dube et al., 2010). The identification strategy we adopt in this paper exploits heterogeneity in firms' exposure to the minimum wage hike, as in Machin et al. (2003), Draca et al. (2011) and Harasztosi and Lindner (2019). This relies on the assumption that firms having no employees impacted by the reform provide a valid counterfactual for affected firms. We show that the employment change in the pre-hike period is not related to the share of affected workers, reinforcing the validity of this assumption. A major advantage of this approach is that all firms operate in the same institutional framework.

Third, Meer and West (2016) suggest that the near-zero effect is the consequence of a focus on direct employment levels rather than on the employment dynamics over time. Our focus on percentage change in employment across firms addresses this concern. The monthly frequency of our data moreover allows to precisely observe firm reactions timing in the short and medium run.³ In particular, we do not observe any change in employment growth in the immediate aftermath of the announcement of the reform⁴. Rather, the employment effect of the policy becomes visible starting with the second quarter of 2014 and remains significant throughout our sample (ending in December 2017).

³To our knowledge, the only other paper on minimum wage using monthly frequency data is Georgiadis and Manning (2020).

⁴The January 1, 2014 minimum wage hike was approved in May 2013.

Fourth, the literature on minimum wage mostly focused on the US and other advanced countries such as the UK (Machin et al., 2003) and Germany (Dustmann et al., 2020), but a growing body of papers investigates the effect in less developed countries⁵. The range of employment effect across countries is very wide. The meta-analysis of Neumark and Corella (2021) aims at explaining this heterogeneity by considering a few key economic and institutional factors such as the sector considered, the bindingness of minimum wages and the level of enforcement. This paper provides evidence of a mechanism that can help to explain part of this heterogeneity. For instance, the very small employment elasticity documented by Harasztosi and Lindner (2019) in Hungary could be partially explained by the absorption of the shock by firms via the envelope margin. The effect estimated using all firms is indeed a weighted average of the reaction of compliant and tax-evading firms. As such, by exploring this type of labor tax-evasion we describe a different type of firms' adjustment margin.

Fifth, another strand of the literature studies compliance to minimum wage policy, observing that a higher minimum wage is associated with a higher non-compliance, measured by the prevalence of subminimum wage payments (e.g., Ashenfelter and Smith, 1979; Goraus-Tanska and Lewandowski, 2016; Clemens and Strain, 2020). Some papers suggest that the government may have incentives in "turning a blind eye", i.e., not to enforce minimum wage legislation (Basu et al., 2010; Garnero and Lucifora, 2020). In this paper, we document the flip side of the same coin: how minimum wage can improve tax enforcement.

This paper also contributes to the literature on tax evasion and tax non-compliance. There is no straightforward way to measure such an invisible phenomenon as tax evasion. A few empirical strategies have been proposed to estimate tax evasion at the micro-level. First, several papers exploit programs of random audits by fiscal authorities (see e.g. Slemrod, 2007 and Kleven et al., 2011). That type of audits programs are however rare and expensive to produce. Instead, many papers use an exogenous shift in the threat of audit (Pomeranz, 2015, Bérgho et al., 2017, Almunia and

⁵Several papers study the impact of minimum wage on the informal sector (see for instance Lemos, 2009, Bosch and Manacorda, 2010 and Meghir et al., 2015). In this literature, individuals have to choose whether to work in the formal or the informal sector. The type of informality that we study in this paper is different, as informality here is located at the intensive margin of formality.

Lopez-Rodriguez, 2018, Naritomi, 2019 among others). Another approach is to rely on discrepancies between different datasources to study tax evasion. For instance, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) measure corporate tax avoidance by inferring the difference between income reported to capital markets and tax authorities, Fisman and Wei (2004) study discrepancies between Hong Kong’s reported exports to China and China’s reported imports from Hong Kong, Artavanis et al. (2016) exploit the difference between a bank’s assessment of individual’s income and the reported income. Kumler et al. (2020) compares the difference between the income reported to the Mexican social security agency and the answer provided in a household survey. We use a similar approach as a validation check for our classification.

To estimate the evolution of tax evasion following the adoption of a flat tax in Russia, Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) propose a methodology based on the discrepancy between reported household income and reported expenditures. The latter approach also relates to the expenditure-based method of Pissarides and Weber (1989). This method allows to estimate the average *thickness* of the envelope at pre-defined group level, for instance by comparing public sector employees to self-employees (see e.g., Feldman and Slemrod, 2007; Hurst et al., 2014; Kukk et al., 2020 for applications). This methodology hence does not allow to sort a general population between compliant and evading observations, as we do in this paper. We use this approach as another validation check.

Finally, a few papers study the link between minimum wage and tax evasion. The closest to our paper is Tonin (2011), who develops a theoretical model describing the interaction between minimum wage legislation and tax evasion by employed labor. The model predicts that the introduction of the minimum wage in a context of widespread income underreporting will result in an increase of compliance and generate a spike at the minimum wage in the income distribution. Tonin (2013) further studies the relationship between this spike and tax compliance. Exploiting an exogenous change in audit threat in Hungary, Bíró et al. (2020) provides further evidence that a significant share of minimum wage earners have much higher total income than reported. They describe a fiscal trade-off: minimum wage enlarges the tax base, as a fraction of firms and workers report a larger share of their income. But on the other hand some workers might go totally informal. Our paper describes an additional, different trade-off for policy-makers: increasing minimum wage increases

enforcement, but at the expense of a slower employment growth of tax-compliant firms.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional framework of the Latvian labor market and the data. In Section 3 we introduce our methodology to classify firms between compliant and tax-evading ones, and provide several validation checks. Section 4 provides estimates of the impact of the minimum wage hike. Section 5 concludes.

2 Institutional context and data

2.1 Institutional context

The Latvian labor market is characterized by a low share of part-time jobs, especially among women (11.9% of employed women and 6.4% of employed men in Latvia, compared to 31.9% and 9.7% for the EU average in 2019) as well as a high share of permanent contracts (93.4%). Trade unions are weak and the coverage of collective bargaining is low, as in many countries in Eastern Europe (Magda, 2017). The relatively strict employment protection legislation is weakly enforced (Eamets and Masso, 2005; Zasova, 2011; OECD, 2013).

The minimum wage covers all employees and all industries. The minimum wage is set by a special government decree after consultations with social partners. There is no obligation for the government to revise the minimum wage regularly. In the last decade, the ratio of the minimum wage to the median wage of full-time workers in Latvia was 0.47-0.52 (the average ratio in the OECD countries that have a statutory minimum wage was 0.50-0.54). The minimum wage between January 2011 and December 2013 was 200 Lats (approximately 285 euro)⁶. In June 2013, the proposal to raise minimum wage to 320 euro on January 1, 2014 was approved by the government, supported by the social partners and the finance ministry. In 2014, the Finance Ministry proposed a further minimum wage hike to 330 euro, but the initiative was not approved. Following the general election in November, the renewed governing coalition approved a minimum wage raise to 360 euro in December 2014, to

⁶Latvia formally became part of the Eurozone on January 1, 2014. The Latvian currency was pegged to the Euro since 2005.

come into effect the following month. The minimum wage thus increased to 360 euro on January 1, 2015. The two consecutive hikes represent a global nominal increase of 26%, and impacts more than 20% of jobs. The minimum wage then remained stable (with a yearly update to adjust for inflation, which was very low over the last decade) till January 1, 2018, when it increased to 430 euro.

One of the explicit motivation for the Finance Ministry to support this series of hikes was to reduce the size of the shadow economy by limiting underreporting behavior. As formalized by Tonin (2011), setting a minimum wage imposes a constraint on the decision to underreport, full-time contracts officially paid below the minimum wage being easily detected by fiscal authorities. Labor tax evasion through envelope wage is a major issue in Latvia, which is considered to be the biggest tax fraud issue (Wor, 2017; OECD, 2019). Putniņš and Sauka (2015) and Jascisens and Zasova (2021) provide further evidence supporting this claim. At the same time, (Hazans, 2011) observes that the share of employed workers without any contract is smaller than in the majority of other European countries.

Regarding taxation, the personal income tax was imposed at a flat-rate (24% in 2013 and 2014, then 23%) before the introduction of different tax brackets in 2018. To introduce some progressivity, income below a certain threshold is exempt from personal income tax. This non-taxable threshold increased from 50 euro per month in 2009 to 100 euro in 2016, but always remained far below the minimum wage. The total cost of labor also encompasses a flat-rate social security contribution shared between the employer and the employee (the employer and the employee respectively pay 23.59% and 10.5% of gross earnings). The social security contributions are paid from the first euro of wage, imposing a high tax wedge even for low wages. Income tax and social security contributions are remitted by employers and wages are reported to tax authorities by employers.

Three main changes in the policy environment taking place over the period in consideration (2011-2017) could potentially interact with our empirical analysis. First, Latvia joined the Eurozone on January 1, 2014. As mentioned above, the Lats was in a fixed peg with the Euro since 2005. This formal change is hence unlikely to have exerted a large impact on the conduct of firms' business. Second, the 2014 Russian crisis have had a significant impact on exporting Baltic firms, as evidenced by Las-


tauskas et al. (2021). Russia, Latvia’s third trading partner at that time, imposed a trade ban on imports of a variety of food and agricultural products from the EU in August 2014. This trade shock may have had an employment effect simultaneously to the 2015 minimum wage hike. We address this possible issue in two ways: i) agriculture and farming companies are not included in the analysis, as detailed below; ii) our analysis relies on monthly employment data. We do not detect any visible drop nor kink in employment dynamics in the aftermaths of the ban. Third, Latvia’s accession to OECD in 2016 implied the transposition of OECD anti-money laundering and anti-tax evasion packages into the Latvian legal framework. These packages however mostly concerns the transparency of international bank operations and anti-bribery policies, not labor tax evasion per se.

2.2 Data

The analysis relies on a combination of administrative and survey data. Figure 2 maps the link between the six main datasources. The core part is a (anonymized) matched employer-employee dataset at the monthly frequency. It provides the gross wage and social security payment for all employees, as well as gender and date of birth. We have access to the 2010-2019 period, but we focus on January 2011 - December 2017 (as the minimum wage changed both in January 2011 and January 2018). This dataset is collected by the Latvian State Revenue Service. It covers the whole population of firms (with the exception of some micro-entreprises and some subsectors such as banking), and contains on average roughly 800,000 unique employees per month after removing individuals with a null wage. It allows us to measure the number of employees working in a firm at each given month as well as the firm-level average wage. We compute the intensity of the minimum wage bite at the firm level using using this information, as described in section 4.

Thanks to the firm ID, we can link this data to various firm-level information. First, we link it with a set of general firm characteristics such as sector, date of creation, juridical status and the likes. Second, we add yearly firm financial statements, as reported to tax authorities. We use this balance sheets to detect firms involved in labor tax evasion, as will be explained in the next section. Third, we also connect our dataset to custom data. This dataset contains information on firm-level export activities on a monthly basis, and provides information on export value and

Figure 2: DATA MAP



NOTE: Dashed lines indicate link for a subsample of the population.

destination country. We use the export share (export/turnover) as a control in the employment analysis provided in section 4.

On the other side, employee ID allows us to combine this administrative dataset with two national surveys. First, we are able to connect our dataset to several waves of the Labor Force Survey (LFS). This allows us to obtain very detailed individual characteristics for a subset of employees such as education, experience, and the likes. Second, we are also able to link our main dataset to the Household Budget Survey (HBS). This survey provides information on household composition, consumption and living conditions. However, the Latvian Central Statistical Bureau (CSB) started to gather household members' individual IDs only since the 2020 round of HBS (covering the year 2019). We will nevertheless use this information as a validation check for firm classification, as will be explained in the next section.

Our analysis focuses on four sectors: manufacturing, wholesale and retail, construction, and transport. We exclude state-owned firms. Similar to Harasztosi and Lindner (2019), we keep all the firms that operate in January 2013 (that we use as a reference period) and that already existed in January 2011, three years before the 2014 minimum wage hike. We observe these firms till December 2017, the month

preceding the next significant minimum wage increase. We keep all the firms closing between the reference and the end of the sample, inputting 0 for the number of employees. We obtain a final sample of 5,524 firms, representing 247,000 employees (about 30% of the total workforce).

3 Detecting tax-evading firms

This section begins with a detailed description of the methodology that we use to classify firms between compliant and tax-evading ones. This classification relies on a set of admittedly strong assumptions, we then proceed with a series of validation checks.

3.1 Description of the approach

The central question this paper aims to answer is whether labor tax-evading firms absorb minimum wage shocks differently than tax-compliant firms. Addressing this question requires to disentangle compliant from non-compliant firms as a preliminary step. Tax evasion being by nature largely unobservable, we would like to *predict* firm type for all the observations in our sample. Machine learning tools can be of great relevance when the goal is predictive accuracy (Varian, 2014)⁷. Implementing a (supervised) classification task requires three key ingredients: 1) a set of variables to be used as predictors; 2) a subsample of firms for which we know the "true" type and 3) an algorithm learning to classify firms.

The general procedure is the following. First, the subsample for which we know the outcome is randomly split in two parts: the training sample (80% of observations) and the test sample (20%). The algorithm is trained on the training sample using 10-fold cross-validation: the training sample is randomly divided in 10 equal sized folds, the model is estimated using 9 of these folds and predicts the classification of the firms contained in the 10th fold. This procedure is repeated until each of the folds has been used as the validation fold. The model performance is evaluated using the average out-of-sample performance. Using 10-fold cross-validation helps

⁷See Mullainathan and Spiess, 2017 and Athey and Imbens, 2019 and for a general comparison of the goals and methods between the machine learning literature and "traditional" econometrics.

to avoid overfitting and to obtain good out-of-sample performance. We tune model parameters to obtain the best possible performance, using AUC as performance metrics. The best model is then run on the firms contained in the test sample, which has never been "seen" by the algorithm at this stage to assess out-of-sample performance. Finally, if performing well, the model can be used to classify the whole universe of firms in the dataset.

We apply gradient boosting decision trees (Friedman, 2001).⁸ The general principle of gradient boosting is to start with a naive prediction and then sequentially update it by a series of additional model fitting the error of the previous model. Each additional model partially correcting the error of its predecessor, this approach can allow to obtain excellent predictive performance (Hastie et al., 2009). A disadvantage of this method is that its blackbox nature makes it uninformative about the relationship between the outcomes and the predictors.

More specifically, consider that y_i denotes the realized outcome for observation i and $f(x_i)$ denotes the prediction based on the vector of predictors x . The objective is to minimize a chosen loss function $\mathcal{L}(y, f(x_i))$ with respect to $f(x_i)$ using gradient descent. The first step is to formulate an initial naive prediction, usually the sample average outcome. The second step is to compute the negative gradient $-g(x_i) = -\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}(y, F(x_i))}{\partial F(x_i)}$.⁹ The third step is to fit a regression tree h to the negative gradient. The fourth step is to partially update the initial prediction depending on the learning rate ρ , so that $f \equiv f + \rho h$. Step 2 to 4 are then repeated until a predetermined number of iterations is reached. This general framework allows for a high flexibility, in particular regarding the loss function that is only required to be differentiable. For binary classification tasks, a Log Loss function is generally used. To prevent overfitting, a regularization term is introduced in the objective function to penalize model complexity.

Regarding the set of predictors, a large accounting and computer science literature on fraud detection has shown that good prediction performance can be obtained

⁸We use *Extreme Gradient Boosting* (Chen and Guestrin, 2016) via its R implementation XGBoost. Alternatively, we also implemented random forest and a standard logit model. Gradient boosting surpassed these alternative both in terms of AUC and prediction accuracy.

⁹As an illustration, note that in the case of a squared loss function like in OLS, the negative gradient is simply the vector of residuals.

using variables from firms' annual financial reports (Cecchini et al., 2010; Hajek and Henriques, 2017; Huang et al., 2014). This approach relies on accounting papers establishing systematic relationships between the probability of manipulation and financial statement items (Beneish, 1999). Labor tax evasion is a type of financial manipulations, and is likely to result in specific balance sheet patterns such as understatement of revenue, assets, costs or liabilities. Economic theory does not provide a formal model as to what these patterns can be. We hence follow a purely data-driven approach and use a battery of financial statement items and financial ratios that have been used in the literature. The complete list of features is provided in Appendix A.

Obtaining a sample of firms for which we know whether they are compliant or tax-evader is not trivial. In the absence of a clearcut measure, we need to rely on assumptions to build this subsample. To determine a subset of tax compliant firms, we consider that firms owned by a Nordic company (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) are tax compliant. DeBacker et al. (2015) document a strong correlation between foreign-controlled owner's cultural norms and illicit corporate activities, in particular regarding tax compliance. Liu (2016) further show that CEO's cultural background is linked to corporate misconduct. At the same time, Fisman and Miguel (2007) show that the misconduct of United Nations officials in Manhattan is correlated with the corruption and legal enforcement norms in the country of origin. Nordic countries regularly tops international ranking in terms of tax compliance and control of corruption such as the Corruption Perceptions Index. Nordic-controlled firms account for approximately 30% of foreign-owned firms in Latvia, and operate in various sectors. The four more represented sectors are manufacturing, wholesale and retail, construction and transport, the same four sectors we focus on. These firms are quite heterogeneous, be it as a matter of number of employees, turnover or profit (see descriptive statistics in appendix A).

For the subset of tax-evading firms, we use firms that are paying a suspiciously low wage to their employees. We estimate a wage equation regressing (the log of) administrative wage on individual employee characteristics in order to spot wage anomalies. We are then able to track firms for whom these individuals work, and consider these firms as tax-evading. In practice, we link the matched employer-employee dataset to the Labor Force Survey over the 2011-2013 period (before the

minimum wage hike takes place). LFS provides a great wealth of individual characteristics absent from the employer-employee data such as occupation, experience, level and field of education, etc. This allows us to estimate a wage equation for a subsamples of employees, regressing the administrative wage on a large amount of individual characteristics. Pooling these three years, excluding self-employed, employees of public firms and keeping only the four sectors of interest, we estimate this wage equation using roughly 3000 employees. The R^2 is equal to 0.28, which is similar to other papers estimating this type of wage regression (see appendix A for more details). We consider that employees in the bottom 10% of the residual distribution are suspiciously low paid, and consider the firm employing them as tax-evading. This is of course a strong assumption. In support of this assumption, we know that a large share of the employees bunching at the minimum wage (see figure 1) do receive envelope wage, as evidenced by Tonin (2011). Many anomalies that we detect are indeed individuals paid at the minimum wage whereas our wage model predicts a much higher income. Second, a simpler version of this approach is used by the Latvian State Revenue Service as an input in their decision to audit a firm¹⁰. From aggregate data, we however know that among firms audited following suspicion of underreported earnings, irregularities are detected in 90% of the cases. Hence this approach may be crude, but rather effective.

To sum up, we train the gradient boosting algorithm using a sample of firms composed of i) Nordic-owned firms, and ii) firms employing workers much below the predicted wage. For both subgroups, we pool observations over the 2011-2013 period. Descriptive statistics and details about the implementation of gradient boosting are provided in appendix A.

Table 1 shows the performance of the tuned algorithm on the test set, indicating a good out-of-sample performance. Note that the model is quite conservative and classify very few compliant firms as tax-evading. The AUC is remarkably high, a coefficient of 0.9 denoting a very good performance. The accuracy is also quite good, even though the base rate (the accuracy we would obtain by naively classifying all the observations as compliant) is itself already quite high due to class imbalance.¹¹.

¹⁰Unfortunately, for legal reasons we do not have access to audit data. The outcome of the audit process could be used to create a sample of tax-evading firms.

¹¹Note also that we select the best model based on AUC since it is not affected by class imbalance.

Table 1: OUT-OF-SAMPLE PERFORMANCE

		Actual	
		0	1
Prediction	0	111	14
	1	2	18
Accuracy	0.890		
AUC	0.932		
Kappa	0.629		

NOTE: Prediction = 0 and Prediction = 1 respectively indicate a firm classified as tax-compliant and a firm classified as tax-evading.

Table 2: CLASSIFICATION RESULTS

	Overall	Construction	Trade	Manufacturing	Transportation
% firms	0.37	0.446	0.356	0.221	0.612
% employees	0.237	0.268	0.266	0.108	0.375

The next step is to classify all the firms in our analysis. To be on the safe side and remain as conservative as possible, in our definition of tax-evading firms we label a firm as an evader if it is classified as an evader for the three years 2011-2012-2013 in a row. The results of this classification are provided in table 2. Overall, 37% of the 5,524 firms in our dataset are considered to be tax-evading. The fact that these firms cover 24% of the employees indicates that evasion mostly occur in small firms, which is consistent with the literature (Putniņš and Sauka, 2015). The proportion drastically changes across sectors. The relative prevalence of tax evasion across sectors is also in line with the literature, the construction sector often being reported as particularly affected by envelope wage whereas manufacturing is known to be one of the least impacted (Putniņš and Sauka, 2015). This suggests that the classification procedure provides reasonable results.

3.2 Validation of the classification

The firm classification between compliant and labor tax-evading ones relies on strong assumptions. In this subsection, we implement three checks to demonstrate the relevance of this method.

First, we exploit the fact that LFS provides a self-reported measure of income. We know in which firm an LFS respondent works, and we know her administrative wage. We can hence compare the difference between the survey income and the official income for employees of compliant firms to the discrepancy for employees of tax-evading firms. For the classification to make sense, we should observe on average a larger positive discrepancy between the survey income and the official income for employees of evading firms than for employees of compliant firms. In the Mexican context, Kumler et al. (2020) implement a similar discrepancy approach, comparing survey to administrative income to estimate wage underreporting. Their objective is to investigate how the discrepancy depends on firm size. In our case, we simply want to know whether the discrepancy is larger for employees of firms classified as tax-evading than for employees of firms classified as tax-compliant. Geographically closer to us, Paulus (2015) examines underreporting in Estonia using a similar comparison, but focuses on underreporting heterogeneity across the income distribution.

In LFS, income is right censored at 1500 Lats (approximately 2000 Euro). We thus exclude individuals with an administrative income larger than 1500 Lats. We also exclude individuals with zero earnings, and focus on individuals reporting to work full-time. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics (in euro) for the discrepancy conditional on the type of the employer (using only pre-minimum wage hike observations). The median and the mean difference for employees of evading firms amounts to respectively 10% and 20% of the minimum wage. On the other hand, the mean and median difference is of much smaller magnitude (and negative) for employees of compliant firms.¹² This confirms that employees of tax-evading firms are more prone to income underreporting than employees of compliant firms.

Second, we can track individuals across firms thanks to the matched employer-employee structure of the dataset. Intuitively, when considering to change employ-

¹²In Estonia, Paulus (2015) reports a negative difference between survey income and administrative income for employees working in sectors where income underreporting is constrained.

Table 3: DIFFERENCE ADMINISTRATIVE/REPORTED WAGE

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Pctl(25)	Median	Pctl(75)
Compliant firms	1,750	-29.522	238.942	-103.981	-11.090	69.949
Tax evading firms	528	66.607	178.963	-22.774	34.240	119.093

Table 4: CHANGE IN WAGE

Statistic	N	Mean	Pctl(25)	Median	Pctl(75)
Δw from E to C	10,763	85.127	-27.268	50.525	177.255
Δw from C to E	10,474	-26.226	-102.786	0.000	85.669
Δw from E to E	5,013	24.680	-41.947	11.227	90.000
Δw from C to C	36,564	32.545	-71.065	29.022	163.305

ment an individual should compare her *true* wage to the *true* alternative wage. If the firm classification is meaningful, we should expect to see on average a large wage increase when an individual switches from a tax-evading firm to a compliant one. Conversely, we should not observe much difference in wage when an employee switches from a compliant firm to a tax-evading one, the wage increase likely being paid in envelope. To check whether this is the case, we take all workers who changed job over the 2011-2013 period for which we have a classification for both the original and destination employer. We compute the average wage over the last three months in the firm of origin (excluding the very last month, which may be truncated or subject to departing bonus), and the average wage over the first three months in the new firm (excluding the very first month for similar reasons). We then compute the difference $\bar{Y}_{post} - \bar{Y}_{pre}$ for the four different types of transition (evading to compliant, compliant to evading, evading to evading and compliant to compliant). The results are provided in table 4. Employees switching from a compliant to an evading firm see on average a *decrease* in their reported wage. On the other hand, individuals switching from an evading to a compliant firm benefit on average of a large wage increase. For employment change within the same type of employer, the average wage change is modest and bounded by these two cases. The ordering of the four transitions is exactly the same when comparing median changes.

Third, to validate the classification we implement an expenditure method *à la*

Pissarides and Weber (1989), who estimate underreporting of self-employed vis-à-vis regular "clean" employees in the UK using household budget survey. The Engel curve provides a relationship between food expenditure and income. Provided that there is no incentives to misreport food expenditures, any systematic difference in propensity to food consumption between the two groups can be interpreted as wage underreporting.¹³ This methodology has been applied in a variety of contexts (see for instance Hurst et al. (2014) in the US, Kukk and Staehr (2014) in Estonia, Engström and Hagen (2017) in Sweden, Nygård et al. (2019) in Norway).

We implement a similar approach, comparing the propensity to food consumption of households where the "main breadwinner" is an employee of a compliant firm to the propensity of households where she is an employee of a tax-evading firm. We use households for which the household head is a public sector employee as a benchmark (as in Paulus (2015)). For this purpose, we link a wave of Household Budget Survey (HBS) to our main data. This European-wide survey is implemented every year in Latvia by the Central Statistical Bureau. However, the individual identifier of a household member is collected only since the 2020 wave of the survey (covering year 2019). Hence, we cannot merge HBS with the rest of the data for the previous years. To overcome this problem, we use the 2018-2019 firms' balance sheet to obtain a firm classification for the 2019 period. If the algorithm performs well in 2013, it should still be of relevance to classify firms in 2019. Equipped with this 2019 firm classification, we are able to classify households in three groups depending on its head: public sector, compliant firms, tax-evading firms. In addition, we consider self-employed as well, to compare the results with the rest of the literature. Appendix B provides a full description of the model and of the sample construction. We estimate the following equation:

$$\ln c_i = \alpha + \beta \ln y_i^{reported} + \gamma D_i + X_i' \phi + \xi_i, \quad (1)$$

where c_i is the food consumption of household i and $y^{reported}$ is the total household income reported in HBS. D is a set of three dummies respectively denoting household head being employed by a compliant firm, a tax-evading firm or being self-employed. X_i is a set of controls (age, number of children, etc.). The reported income is

¹³See appendix B for a detailed presentation of the methodology.

Table 5: MISREPORTING REGRESSION

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	ln(consumption)	
	(1)	(2)
β (consumption propensity)	0.407*** (0.074)	0.393*** (0.074)
γ (compliant firms)	-0.079 (0.054)	-0.039 (0.059)
γ (tax-evading firms)	0.185** (0.077)	0.178** (0.086)
γ (self-employed)	0.300*** (0.105)	0.323*** (0.112)
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	431	431

NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The first column does not include controls (see the list in appendix B) whereas the second column does.

endogenous by construction in the model. This equation is thus estimated via 2SLS, instrumenting reported income by education and region (as for instance in Hurst et al. (2014) and Kukk and Staehr (2014)). To stick to this literature, we restrict the sample to households composed of two adults, with children or not.

We report the main results in table 5. We do not observe any difference in propensity to food consumption between employees of the public sector and employees of compliant firms. However, the underreporting coefficient for employees of tax-evading firms is significant. The share of underreported income amounts to 35%.¹⁴ Note that the underreporting coefficient for employees of tax-evading firm is below the coefficient for self-employed, which is similar to what Kukk et al. (2020) find for Latvia.¹⁵ This provides evidence of a reasonable classification.

¹⁴See the details of the calculus in appendix B.

¹⁵We obtain a larger estimate because our benchmark group is restricted to public employees whereas they use all employees.

4 The impact of the minimum wage hike

4.1 Empirical strategy

Equipped with a firm classification for tax-compliance, we now turn to the estimation of the minimum wage hike effects. The identification strategy closely follows Machin et al. (2003), Draca et al. (2011) and Harasztosi and Lindner (2019). It exploits the heterogeneity in the intensity of the minimum wage impact: firms employing many minimum wage workers are more affected by the reform than firms employing just a few. It allows to implement a difference-in-differences analysis, using the intensity of the impact as a continuous treatment. The regression model can be written as follows:

$$\frac{y_{it} - y_{i,ref}}{y_{i,ref}} = \alpha_t + \beta_t FA_i + \delta_t D_i + \lambda_t FA_i \times D_i + \gamma_t X_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

The left-hand side of the equation is the percentage change in employment in firm i between period t and January 2013, the reference period. This choice of a reference period is driven by the fact that it precedes discussions related to an increase of the minimum wage. As explained in section 2, we focus on firms with at least 6 employees. Firms that shut down are preserved in the sample, hence experiencing a 100% decline in employment compared to the reference period. The estimated employment effect measures both the intensive and extensive margins.

D_i is the binary variable indicating whether firm i is tax-evader. FA denotes the intensity of the minimum wage shock for firm i . We measure firm exposure in two complementary alternative ways that are standard in the literature. First, FA , the fraction of affected, is computed as the share of (full-time) workers receiving in January 2013 a wage below the next minimum wage.¹⁶ Second, GAP is a measure indicating the percentage increase of the total wage needed for a firm to comply with the next minimum wage level:

$$GAP_i = \frac{\sum_j \max(w_{ji}^{min} - w_{ji}, 0)}{\sum_j w_{ji}}.$$

Each of these two measures is computed in two ways. The minimum wage increased by 12% on January 2014, then by 12.5% on January 2015. To study the

¹⁶The data source does not indicate whether an employee is full-time or part-time. Appendix C describes the methodology used to disentangle them.

Table 6: FIRM DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	All N=5,524		Compliant N=3,312		Tax evaders N=2,212	
	Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean	Median
# employees	44.634	17	57.215	22	25.797	13
Average wage	477.289	332.346	578.036	422.769	326.442	277.085
FA_{2014}	0.275	0.1	0.212	0.02	0.371	0.2
FA_{2015}	0.390	0.2	0.307	0.1	0.515	0.6
GAP_{2014}	0.023	0.036	0.017	0.001	0.032	0.011
GAP_{2015}	0.062	0.015	0.047	0.01	0.085	0.054
Firm age	14.421	15	14.140	15	14.842	16
Profitability (profit/revenue)	0.021	0.018	0.019	0.017	0.023	0.021
Export share (export/revenue)	0.118	0	0.166	0.000	0.047	0
Labor share (labor cost/revenue)	0.136	0.102	0.135	0.103	0.138	0.101

NOTE: Firm descriptive statistics in January 2013. FA_{2014} and GAP_{2014} indicates the bite of the 2014 minimum wage hike, FA_{2015} and GAP_{2015} the bite of the 2015 minimum wage increase.

short-run employment effect of the 2014 hike, we compute FA_{2014} and GAP_{2014} depending on the 2014 minimum wage level. This will allow us to observe employment dynamics over the course of 2013 and 2014, independently from the second minimum wage hike. For medium-run analysis, we compute FA_{2015} and GAP_{2015} based on the 2015 minimum wage level.¹⁷

The set of controls X contains firm age, legal status, NACE sector, average export share, average share of labor, average profit as well as the square of the latter three variables, measured between 2011 and 2013. Descriptive statistics are provided in table 6. All the regressions are estimated using the logarithm of average turnover over the 2011-2013 period, similar to Harasztosi and Lindner (2019).¹⁸

This empirical strategy essentially consists in a repeated cross-section analysis. The regression is run for each period t . For compliant firms, β_t provides the cumulative change in employment between t and January 2013 relative to untreated compliant firms. For tax-evading firms, the equivalent is provided by $\beta_t + \delta_t + \lambda_t$.

¹⁷Several papers similarly focus on a multi-stage increase of minimum wage, studying the sequence of hikes as a whole event (e.g., Harasztosi and Lindner, 2019).


¹⁸Some papers use weights, some others do not (e.g., Machin et al., 2003; Draca et al., 2011). All the results presented below are qualitatively insensitive to this choice.

4.2 Results

We begin with a simple regression of the percentage change in employment on FA and the set of controls for the subsample of compliant firms and the subsample of tax-evading firms separately. Figure 3a displays the short-run estimates of β for the subsample of tax-compliant firms. Period 0 indicates January 2013. The minimum wage hike is announced in period 5 (May 2013) and is implemented in period 12 (January 2014). A significant decrease in employment growth starting in April 2014 emerges. Employment in a compliant firm with 100% of its employees affected by the minimum wage hike decreases by 12% compared to a similar firm not affected by the hike. This is quite sizeable over such a short period of time. Note that nothing happens in the direct aftermath of the announcement. It also takes a quarter after the implementation to observe a significant effect. Figure 3b reports the results of the same exercise but with the subsample of tax-evading firms. The results are in stark contrast to the previous graph: the coefficient associated with FA is never significant. In other words, the share of affected workers is irrelevant to explain the change in employment in evading firms. Besides significance, the point estimates are also of a much smaller magnitude than in the case of compliant firms. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that labor tax evasion can be used as a shock absorber.


An identifying assumption is that in the absence of a change in minimum wage, employment in affected firms would have evolved in the same way as in non-affected firms. To verify whether this assumption is credible, figure 3 also reports the estimates for β when we compare employment in January 2013 to employment in past periods. For instance, the point estimate at period -12 indicates the percentage change in employment between January 2012 and January 2013. The share of affected workers is not a determinant of the change in employment in the pre-minimum wage reform, in accordance to the parallel trend assumption.

Figure 3: Employment effect - short run



Does this difference between compliant and tax-evading firms persist over time? We reproduce this exercise using firm exposure to the overall minimum wage hikes to investigate the medium run effect. The results are displayed in figure 4. In December 2017, three years after the January 2015 minimum wage hike, there is still no discernable employment effect for tax-evading firms, indicating that they absorbed the shock differently than compliant firms. Compliant firms affected by the minimum wage hike keep decreasing in size even in the medium-run.

Figure 4: Employment effect - medium run



We now turn to the estimation of equation 2 on the full sample of firms. We first study the short run effect, focusing on the 2014 minimum wage hike alone, then

consider both hikes together. Columns 1 and 2 of table 7 report the regression results using the percentage change in employment between January 2013 and December 2014 with and without the set of controls, using *FA* as the treatment variable. It confirms that for a given share of affected workers, the employment response has been much more salient for compliant firms than for tax-evading ones. Figure 5 plots the predicted change in employment between December 2014 and January 2013 conditional on the variables involved in this interaction.¹⁹ The change in employment is very similar for compliant and tax-evading firms not affected by the policy change. For firms with 100% of their employees affected, the point estimate is three times smaller for evading firms than for compliant ones (-12.8% vs -4.6%). The same conclusion is reached when using *GAP* instead of *FA*, as displayed in columns 3 and 4.

The short run estimates imply an employment elasticity with respect to minimum wage for the directly affected workers amounting to -1.1 for compliant firms and -0.4 for evading firms. These elasticities are calculated using the whole population of employees, and not only categories of employees particularly affected by the minimum wage hike, such as teenage workers in the US literature. To be comparable with the latter, we hence need to multiply our elasticities by 0.25, which is the share of directly impacted teenage workers in US. This gives us elasticities of -0.275 and -0.1. This corresponds to the two bounds of the -0.1/-0.3 elasticity range surveyed by Neumark and Wascher (2010) and Brown (1999). The difference in employment effect depending on tax compliance is hence sizeable. Focusing on middle income and developing countries, Neumark and Corella (2021) suggest an employment elasticity of -0.102. Part of the large cross-country heterogeneity they document could be explained by the underestimation of the effect for countries where envelope wages are widespread (e.g., Poland and Turkey). Harasztosi and Lindner (2019) obtain employment estimates close to 0 following a large minimum wage hike in Hungary in 2001, where envelope wage was very common at that time (Tonin, 2011). Our results suggests that this could be a lower bound estimate.


¹⁹The graphical representation of the interaction using *GAP* is provided in appendix C.

Table 7: SHORT-RUN EMPLOYMENT REGRESSIONS

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	% change Jan 13 - Dec 14			% change Jan 13 - Jul 12		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Evasion	-0.009 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.006 (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)
<i>FA</i>	-0.163*** (0.021)	-0.128*** (0.012)			0.006 (0.015)	
<i>FA</i> × Evasion	0.082*** (0.029)	0.082*** (0.018)			-0.003 (0.021)	
<i>GAP</i>			-0.977*** (0.149)	-0.727*** (0.150)		-0.010 (0.099)
<i>GAP</i> × Evasion			0.487*** (0.188)	0.452** (0.186)		0.003 (0.137)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,524	5,524	5,524	5,524	5,524	5,524
R ²	0.013	0.048	0.010	0.046	0.067	0.067


NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The set of controls include firm age, legal status, NACE code, labor share and its square, profitability and its square, export share and its square .

Figure 5: Employment effect - interaction



The point estimates capture both the extensive and intensive margins, as firms closing in the aftermath of the minimum wage hike are kept in the sample. To disentangle the relative importance of these two margins, we estimate the probability for a firm to close using in linear probability model and the same left-hand side variables as in equation 2. The results, provided in table C.3 in appendix C, indicate that compliant firms do adjust at the extensive margin: the probability for a severely affected compliant firm to close is much larger than for a compliant non-affected firm. This contrasts with tax-evading firms, for which the probability to close remains about the same irrespective of the intensity of the shock. Second, we estimate equation 2 keeping only firms surviving throughout the 2011-2017 period (hence excluding all the firms that shut down after the hike). The results, displayed in table C.2 in appendix C, show that compliant firms do also adjust employment at the intensive margin.

Figure 6: Firm closure - interaction



We document a clear difference in employment (no) response between compliant and tax-evading ones in the short-run. We now investigate the medium run effect, considering the two consecutive minimum wage hikes altogether. Table 8 provides the results when comparing the percentage change in employment between January 2013 and December 2015, 2016 and 2017 (the last month of our sample). The measure of treatment intensity is FA_{2015} , the share of full-time employees paid below

Table 8: MEDIUM-RUN EMPLOYMENT REGRESSIONS

% change	<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
	Jan 13	Jan 12	Dec 15	Dec 16	Dec 17	Jan 12	Dec 15	Dec 16	Dec 17
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
Evasion	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.048*** (0.018)	-0.070*** (0.021)	-0.124*** (0.025)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.034** (0.016)	-0.049*** (0.018)	-0.099*** (0.022)	
FA_{2015}		0.019 (0.013)	-0.197*** (0.023)	-0.260*** (0.026)	-0.316*** (0.028)				
$FA_{2015} \times$ Evasion		-0.027 (0.017)	0.164*** (0.031)	0.208*** (0.036)	0.275*** (0.039)				
GAP_{2015}					0.038 (0.061)	-0.936*** (0.109)	-1.225*** (0.122)	-1.524*** (0.132)	
$GAP_{2015} \times$ Evasion					-0.063 (0.079)	0.759*** (0.141)	0.920*** (0.160)	1.276*** (0.177)	
Observations	5,524	5,524	5,524	5,524	5,524	5,524	5,524	5,524	
R ²	0.018	0.062	0.085	0.079	0.018	0.061	0.083	0.077	


NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. FA_{2015} and GAP_{2015} measure the intensity of the 2014 and 2015 minimum wage hikes altogether with respect to firm-level employment in January 2013. All regressions include the following controls: firm age, legal status, NACE code, labor share and its square, profitability and its square, export share and its square.

the 2015 minimum wage in January 2013. The employment change for affected compliant firms plummeted, whereas even in the medium run tax-evading firms did not experience a significant staff reduction. Between January 2013 and December 2017, the employment elasticity with respect to minimum wage is equal to -1.2 for compliant firms and -0.6 for tax evading ones, hence remaining largely different. The results using GAP_{2015} are similar, and displayed in table 8.

The absence of employment reaction for tax-evading firms could also be explained by a non-compliance with the new minimum wage, as documented for instance by Basu et al. (2010). For instance, this could take the form of full-time employees artificially switching to part-time. To investigate this alternative channel, we estimate the effect of minimum wage hike on average gross wage. Wage being only observable for surviving firms, we restrict the sample accordingly. We examine changes in average gross wage between January 2013 and four periods: June 2012 (one year before the announcement of the hike, placebo check), June 2013 (announcement of the hike), January 2014 (first month after the first hike) and January 2015 (first month after the second hike).

The first panel of table 9 displays the results, alternatively using FA_{2015} and GAP_{2015} . We do not observe any difference in employment growth in the pre-hike period. Average wage does not change in the direct aftermath of the minimum wage announcement. However, average wages sharply increase directly after the implementation of the new minimum wage levels, both in 2014 and in 2015. The change in average between January 2013 and January 2014 conditional on minimum wage bite and tax evasion is plotted in figure 7a. The average wage increases in a parallel way in the two groups, suggesting that tax evading firms did not avoid the increase in labor cost differently than compliant firms. The conclusion is similar when focusing on the 2015 hike. To further study this point, we proceed to the same analysis using firm-level average income tax and average social contribution. The results are displayed respectively in panel 2 and panel 3 of table 9. Both exhibit a sharp increase following the minimum wage hike. Firm reaction was similar irrespective of their type, as shown in figure 7. Increasing minimum wage hence did have a negative employment effect, but did indeed increase income tax revenue and social contribution. This rules out the explanation that tax-evading firms reduce their use of labor at the intensive margin differently than compliant firms. From a policy point of view, these results show that the objective of raising low-wage workers social cover effectively targeted workers likely to receive envelope wage.

Figure 7: Effect on other measures



5 Conclusion

This paper provides a firm-level analysis of a minimum wage hike in a context of prevalent labor tax evasion. We provide two main contributions to the literature.

Table 9: WAGE REGRESSIONS

% change Jan 13 -	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Jun 12	Jun 13	Jan 14	Jan 15	Jun 12	Jun 13	Jan 14	Jan 15
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Wage								
Evasion	0.007 (0.009)	0.015 (0.009)	0.020* (0.011)	0.061*** (0.019)	0.014* (0.009)	0.024** (0.011)	0.063 (0.044)	0.005 (0.008)
FA_{2015}	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.020 (0.013)	0.077*** (0.017)	0.158*** (0.024)				
$FA_{2015} \times$ Evasion	-0.011 (0.015)	-0.018 (0.018)	-0.011 (0.022)	-0.050 (0.032)				
GAP_{2015}					0.033 (0.100)	-0.169 (0.151)	0.767*** (0.180)	0.768*** (0.284)
$GAP_{2015} \times$ Evasion					-0.076 (0.140)	-0.203 (0.182)	-0.192 (0.217)	-0.275 (0.378)
Income tax								
Evasion	0.077** (0.028)	0.061* (0.036)	0.179*** (0.032)	0.071** (0.056)	0.065** (0.031)	0.154*** (0.028)	0.035 (0.044)	(0.024)
FA_{2015}	0.027 (0.042)	0.028 (0.047)	0.118** (0.048)	0.312*** (0.054)				
$FA_{2015} \times$ Evasion	-0.022 (0.050)	-0.068 (0.058)	-0.027 (0.059)	-0.149* (0.083)				
GAP_{2015}					0.454 (0.368)	0.439 (0.458)	1.412*** (0.455)	1.531*** (0.284)
$GAP_{2015} \times$ Evasion					-0.144 (0.452)	-0.673 (0.538)	-0.503 (0.558)	-0.531 (0.378)
Social contribution								
Evasion	0.008 (0.009)	0.015 (0.009)	0.020* (0.011)	0.072*** (0.017)	0.014* (0.009)	0.023** (0.010)	0.074* (0.044)	0.005 (0.008)
FA_{2015}	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.020 (0.013)	0.076*** (0.016)	0.168*** (0.018)				
$FA_{2015} \times$ Evasion	-0.011 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.012 (0.021)	-0.054* (0.028)				
GAP_{2015}					0.032 (0.100)	-0.173 (0.150)	0.749*** (0.175)	0.777*** (0.284)
$GAP_{2015} \times$ Evasion					-0.074 (0.140)	-0.205 (0.182)	-0.193 (0.211)	-0.280 (0.378)
Observations	5,391	5,391	5,391	5,391	5,391	5,391	5,391	5,391

NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. FA_{2015} and GAP_{2015} measure the intensity of the 2014 and 2015 minimum wage hikes altogether with respect to firm-level employment in January 2013. All regressions include the following controls: firm age, legal status, NACE code, labor share and its square, profitability and its square, export share and its square.

First, we propose a novel methodology to classify firms between compliant and labor tax avoiders using machine learning. This methodology relies on strong assumptions,

but several validity checks confirm the relevance of the approach. This classification method can be used in other countries where envelope wage is a widespread phenomenon provided that two necessary (but not sufficient) conditions are met: i) to have access to firms' balance sheet for the population of firms and employee-level information for a subsample of workers; ii) to have a context where a subsample of firms can be considered as compliant. The trends towards a more widespread access to administrative data will make condition i) easier to satisfy in the coming years. An alternative path could be to use audit data to construct a sample of compliant and non-compliant firms. Audits are however rarely random, and this non-randomness would imply that some types of evading firms are not captured. Our approach is not immune to this critic either, as what we capture is likely to emphasize labor tax evasion at the bottom of the wage distribution. Note also that our classification does not aim to serve as evasion detection device, but rather as a proxy for labor tax evasion.

Equipped with this classification tool, we study conditional employment effect of a large minimum wage hike. Compared to the existing literature, the magnitude and the bite of this episode are both in the upper bound. We find that employment in firms paying envelope wage is much less sensitive than in compliant firms. This is consistent with the model proposed by Tonin (2011), and envelope wages can help firms to absorb minimum wage shocks. Raising minimum wage hence contribute to the enforcement of the tax policy and help to increase social protection coverage of workers, in addition to increasing the average wage. Policy makers however do face a trade-off, as a minimum wage hike can however have a negative effect on compliant firms employing minimum wage workers. We only document short and medium run partial equilibrium effects. One of the negative effects of labor tax evasion is a competition distortion. If raising minimum wage increases compliance, on the long run all compliant firms will benefit from a reduction in these distortions. Similarly, our results are obtained focusing on firms that existed before the reform and we do not address the question of firm entry. Also, we do not study the reallocation effect of the minimum wage hike. Dustmann et al. (2020) provide evidence of such reallocation effects studying the introduction of a minimum wage in Germany. Finally, even if increasing minimum wage leads to an increase of workers' social protection and average *reported* wage, Tonin (2011) provides evidence that affected workers can

actually see a *decrease* in their total disposable income because of a larger tax base. In future work, all these additional effects should be integrated in a unified framework to estimate meaningful welfare consequences of a minimum wage hike.

A Classification details

This appendix provides additional details on the classification procedure. As for the main part of the analysis, we restrict the sample to firms with at least 6 employees over the 2011-2013 period operating in the manufacturing, trade/retail, construction or transport sector. We begin with a description of the construction of the sample for training and testing the classification algorithm. This sample is composed of two parts. First, as a subsample of tax-compliant firms, we use the set of firms owned by a Nordic company (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) over the 2011-2013 period. Data on foreign ownership is provided by the Latvian Central Statistical Bureau (CSB). In 2013, foreign-owned firms account for 13.3% of the firms in the sample and Nordic-owned companies for 3.5%.

Second, to obtain a set of tax-evading firms we proceed as follows. We merge the matched employer-employee data in the pre-reform period (2011-2013) to the three LFS waves over the same period. Restricting the sample to the same sectors as above and to full-time employees, we are left with roughly 3,000 individuals. We then estimate a standard wage equation as follows, where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the administrative wage (i.e., the wage reported to the tax authorities). The set of regressors is composed of:

- Age, age^2 , experience and experience^2 (all expressed in years),
- Dummy variables representing gender and whether the individual lives in a urban or rural area,
- A series of categorical variables indicating the attained level education, the field of education, the type of occupation, the sector, the region in Latvia where the work is located, and the year where the interview has taken place.

The R^2 is equal to 0.26, which is very close to other papers estimating a similar wage equations (e.g., 0.27 in Harmon and Walker, 1995). We keep observations in the bottom 10% of the residual distribution. From these 300 observations, more than half earns no more than 110% of the minimum wage. We then retrieve in which firms the individuals "suspiciously low paid" individuals work and classify them as tax-evaders. Each firm with at least one employee in the bottom of the error distribution is classified as such. Anecdotally, we find only one Nordic-owned

firm that is having an employee in the bottom of the residual distribution. After discarding this observation, we are left with 730 firm observations. This sample size is of similar order as in the rest of the literature on financial fraud detection (see e.g., Ravisankar et al., 2011 for a survey). Some descriptive statistics are provided in table A.1. The four sectors are fairly represented across the two subsamples.

Table A.1: Sample statistics

	N	Pctl(25)	Median	Pctl(75)
<u>Tax evading firms</u>				
# employees	126	23	47	119
Turnover	126	744,666.5	1,868,954	5,794,959.0
Profit	126	48,021.5	210,469.5	648,033.5
Manufacturing	42			
Trade	37			
Transportation	33			
Construction	14			
<u>Compliant firms</u>				
# employees	569	15	35	76
Turnover	569	1,178,442	3,070,452	7,754,268
Profit	569	233,658	586,216	1,433,347
Manufacturing	261			
Trade	237			
Transportation	52			
Construction	19			

We use information from firms' balance sheet as predictors. We use a combination of ratio and direct balance sheet items that have previously been used for the study of firm-level fraud detection (Beneish, 1999; Kotsiantis et al., 2006; Kirkos et al., 2007; Cecchini et al., 2010; Ravisankar et al., 2011; West and Bhattacharya, 2016; Hajek and Henriques, 2017). The complete list encompasses the following variables: asset, fixed asset, net sales, gross profit, selling cost, other operating income, administrative cost, net margin, operating margin, return on equity, return on asset, total asset to revenue, cash to revenue, non-cash working capital to revenue, fixed asset to total asset, growth in revenue, selling and administrative cost to revenue, non-cash working capital, book debt to total asset, liquidity (cash to asset), growth of cash flow, tax aggressiveness (corporate tax on asset). As suggested by Hastie et al. (2009), we do

not screen predictors based on their univariate correlation with the target variable prior to cross-validation.

We divide the sample randomly in two parts: 80% of the observations are assigned to the training group, the remaining 20% to the testing group. We apply gradient boosting via the R package XGBoost through the Tidymodel interface. We set the number of trees contained in the ensemble to 1000, and tune the model using four hyperparameters: the maximum depth of the tree, the minimum number of data points in a node that is required for the node to be split further, the learning rate, and the reduction in the loss function required to split further. For finding the best model (with respect to AUC), we use 10-fold cross-validation. We check the out-of-sample performance on the training set, and then classify the whole universe of firms contained in the main sample.

B The expenditure-based method

This appendix provides a description of the expenditure-based method originally proposed by Pissarides and Weber (1989). This approach allows to estimate the extent of underreporting for a group of households using reported income and expenditures data. It relies on two main assumptions: i) food expenditures (or any other item) is accurately reported for all groups; ii) income reporting is accurate for at least one group in the population. Pissarides and Weber (1989) consider two population groups: employees and self-employed, respectively denoted $k = W$ and $k = S$. Employees are assumed to correctly report wage. Food expenditures and true permanent income are related by the Engel curve:

$$\ln c_i = \alpha + \beta \ln y_i^P + X_i' \phi + \epsilon_i \tag{B.1}$$

where c_i denotes food expenditure in household i , y_i^P is the permanent income, X_i is a set of household characteristics (number of children, etc.) and ϵ_i is an error term. Consumption is based on permanent income, but surveys usually enquire about current income. Denoting p_i the fraction of true current income to true permanent income, we can write:

$$\ln y_i = \ln p_i + \ln y_i^P. \tag{B.2}$$

where p_i is assumed to follow a log-normal distribution so that $\ln p_i = \mu_p + u_i$, where μ_p is the sample mean of $\ln p_i$ and u_i is a disturbance with $E[u_i] = 0$ and $\sigma_u^2 = \text{Var}(u_i)$.

Self-employed respondents have incentives not to correctly report their income in the survey (e.g., worries that survey answers are shared with tax authorities). The relationship between the reported current income y_i and the true current income y_i^* is

$$\ln y_i = \ln \kappa_i + \ln y_i^*. \quad (\text{B.3})$$

κ_i is the underreporting factor, which is assumed to be log-normal so that $\ln \kappa_i = \mu_\kappa + v_i$ with $E[v_i] = 0$ and $\sigma_v^2 = \text{Var}(v_i)$. All employee households are assumed to have $\kappa = 1$: they do not underreport their income. This implies that $\sigma_{v|W}^2 = 0$ for employees whereas $\sigma_{v|S}^2 > 0$ for self-employed.

Combining equations B.2 and B.3, the true permanent income can be written as:

$$\ln y_i^P = \ln y_i^* + \ln \kappa_i - \ln p_i = \ln y_i^* + (\mu_\kappa + v_i) - (\mu_p + u + i) \quad (\text{B.4})$$

Inserting equation B.4 in equation B.1, the Engel curve is expressed as:

$$\ln c_i = \alpha + \beta \ln y_i^* + \beta(\mu_\kappa - \mu_p) + X_i' \phi + \beta(v_i - u_i) + \epsilon_i \quad (\text{B.5})$$

This equation corresponds to empirical specification described in equation 1 in section 3.2, where $\beta(v_i - u_i)$ is substituted with γD_i , so that $\gamma = \beta(\mu_\kappa + \frac{1}{2}(\sigma_{u|S}^2 - \sigma_{u|W}^2))$, and the three error terms are encompassed in ξ_i . The coefficient γ captures the systematic food expenditure shift of self-employed with respect to employees.

The mean underreporting factor $\bar{\kappa}$ can hence be computed as follows:

$$\bar{\kappa} = \exp\left(\frac{\gamma}{\beta} + \frac{1}{2}(\sigma_{v|S}^2 + \sigma_{u|W}^2 - \sigma_{u|S}^2)\right) \quad (\text{B.6})$$

The variance terms usually being unknown, Pissarides and Weber (1989) show that we can obtain lower and upper bound estimates for $\bar{\kappa}$ such that:

$$\bar{\kappa} = \left[\exp\left(\frac{\gamma}{\beta} - \frac{1}{2}(\sigma_{\xi|S}^2 - \sigma_{\xi|W}^2)\right), \exp\left(\frac{\gamma}{\beta} + \frac{1}{2}(\sigma_{\xi|S}^2 - \sigma_{\xi|W}^2)\right) \right] \quad (\text{B.7})$$

Table B.1: HBS - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Ln food consumption	431	7.943	0.452	6.470	9.287
Ln income	431	9.161	0.763	4.981	11.579
Public sector	431	0.520	0.500	0	1
Compliant firms	431	0.318	0.466	0	1
Tax-evading firms	431	0.118	0.323	0	1
Self-Employed	431	0.044	0.206	0	1

NOTE: Public sector, compliant firms, tax-evading firms and self-employed indicate the type of employment of the household head.

In the framework of this paper, we consider four groups of households: where the head works in public sector, in a compliant firm, in a tax-evading firm or whether the head is self-employed. Public sector is the base group, where envelope wages presumably do not exist. This assumption is consistent with the Latvian context, where several waves of public sector reforms have been implemented in the 2000's. Public sector employees are also used as the reference group in a study in Estonia Paulus (2015). Note also that the underreporting estimates are *relative*. In other words, it estimates the *additional* underreporting of a group of household compared to another one. It provides an absolute measure only if the reference group does indeed correctly report their income.

Turning to the estimation of equation 1, note that the reported income is endogenous by construction. To overcome this issue, we instrument current income by education of the household head (three levels) and region, since the average wage differs across regions Latvia. The underlying assumption is that these variables do not affect food expenditure other than through wage. As for the set of controls included in both stages, it contains the number of children, the number of working adults, head's age and gender, and a dummy indicating whether the household rents its dwelling. As is standard in the literature, we keep only households composed of two adults and children (if any). Descriptive statistics are displayed in table B.1.

Assuming that the variance term is equal in the two groups, as for instance in Hurst et al. (2014), then the underreporting estimate simplifies to $\bar{\kappa} = \exp\left(\frac{\gamma}{\beta}\right)$. From the regression results displayed in table 5, we can hence compute that for em-

ployees of tax-evading firms, $\bar{\kappa} = \exp\left(\frac{0.185}{0.497}\right) \approx 1.57$. The share of underreported income is hence $\frac{\bar{\kappa} - 1}{\bar{\kappa}} \approx 0.35$, as reported in section 3.2.

C Minimum wage effect - Additional results

This section provides additional details regarding the estimation of the minimum wage effect. First, as mentioned in section 4, the two measures FA and GAP are computed using firm-level full-time employees. The motivation for this choice is that before 2014 the number of hours was not mandatory to report. In addition, the reported number of hours takes only into account effective hours. Employees taking holidays will exhibit lower working hours this month than usual. This prevents us to compute hourly wage, and compute the magnitude of the bite using all employees.

To disentangle part-time from full-time employees, we start by computing the mode of working hours distribution for each month. This provides us with the legal number of hours for a full-time equivalent job for each month. This number changes every month depending on the number of working days. We then consider an employee in a given firm as full-time for a given month if: i) the reported number of hours is equal to or greater than 90% of the monthly mode or if ii) the number of hours is missing but the wage is greater than 90% of the monthly minimum wage. These assumptions are likely to overestimate the number of full-time employees. To compute FA and GAP , in order to mitigate this effect we restrict full-time employees as workers satisfying one of these conditions at least half of the months spent in a given firm within a year. For instance, an employee working 6 months in a given firm in 2012 earning 4 months more than the minimum wage but two months less than the minimum wage will be considered as a full-time employee. The support for FA conditional on firm type is displayed in figure C.1. For both types of firm, the support ranges from 0 to 1.

Figure C.1: Distribution of FA




Figure C.2 reproduces figure 5 using GAP instead of FA . It displays the interaction of GAP and the tax-evasion dummy from column (4) of table 7.

Figure C.2: Employment effect - interaction




Table C.1 displays the results obtained when FA and GAP are not based on the information in January 2013, but rather on the average number of employees over 2012. The results are in line with those displayed in table 7 in section 4.

Table C.1: EMPLOYMENT EFFECT - AVERAGE FA AND GAP

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	% change Jan 13 - Dec 14			% change Jan 13 - Jul 12		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Evasion	-0.020 (0.013)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.019 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.012)	0.008 (0.010)	0.004 (0.009)
FA_{mean}	-0.127*** (0.021)	-0.108*** (0.011)			-0.007 (0.013)	
$FA_{mean} \times$ Evasion	0.088*** (0.028)	0.085*** (0.016)			-0.001 (0.019)	
GAP_{mean}			-1.278*** (0.199)	-1.063*** (0.201)		-0.115 (0.126)
$GAP_{mean} \times$ Evasion			0.940*** (0.261)	0.903*** (0.258)		0.106 (0.177)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,524	5,524	5,524	5,524	5,524	5,524
R ²	0.008	0.046	0.009	0.047	0.067	0.068

NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses. The set of controls includes the following controls: firm age, legal status, NACE code, labor share and its square, profitability and its square, export share and its square.

Table C.2 is similar to table 7 in section 4 except that the models are run using only firms that survived throughout the the whole period covered in the sample. The results thus provide information on the employment effect at the intensive margin. Together with table C.3, the results indicate that firms use both the intensive and the extensive employment margins.

Table C.3 shows the effect of the interaction between minimum wage hike and tax evasion on firm closure. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the firm has closed by the given period. Figure 6 in section 4 represents the interaction in column (1).

Table C.2: EMPLOYMENT EFFECT - INTENSIVE MARGIN

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	% change Jan 13 - Dec 14			% change Jan 13 - Jul 12		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Evasion	-0.026** (0.012)	-0.023** (0.009)	-0.026** (0.011)	-0.023** (0.012)	0.009 (0.009)	0.009 (0.008)
<i>FA</i>	-0.102*** (0.018)	-0.080*** (0.012)			-0.001 (0.014)	
<i>FA</i> × Evasion	0.051** (0.025)	0.052*** (0.017)			-0.006 (0.019)	
<i>GAP</i>			-1.025*** (0.184)	-0.773*** (0.179)		-0.008 (0.138)
<i>GAP</i> × Evasion			0.573** (0.246)	0.574** (0.239)		-0.092 (0.188)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,391	5,391	5,391	5,391	5,391	5,391
R ²	0.007	0.041	0.007	0.041	0.070	0.070

NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses. The set of controls includes the following controls: firm age, legal status, NACE code, labor share and its square, profitability and its square, export share and its square.

Table C.3: FIRM CLOSURE

<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
Probability to shut down								
	Dec 14	Dec 15	Dec 16	Dec 17	Dec 14	Dec 15	Dec 16	Dec 17
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Evasion	-0.011**	-0.007	0.010	0.027**	-0.011**	-0.010	-0.001	0.012
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.011)
FA_{2015}	0.043***	0.058***	0.092***	0.128***				
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.018)				
$FA_{2015} \times$ Evasion	-0.036***	-0.071***	-0.115***	-0.158***				
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.024)				
GAP_{2015}					0.428***	0.317***	0.457***	0.653***
					(0.131)	(0.074)	(0.084)	(0.095)
$GAP_{2015} \times$ Evasion					-0.391***	-0.398***	-0.545***	-0.757***
					(0.142)	(0.083)	(0.101)	(0.117)
Observations	5,524	5,524	5,524	5,524	5,524	5,524	5,524	5,524
R^2	0.023	0.055	0.075	0.083	0.023	0.056	0.075	0.083

NOTE: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating that the firm has shut down at that date. FA_{2015} and GAP_{2015} measure the intensity of the 2014 and 2015 minimum wage hikes together with respect to firm-level employment in January 2013. All regressions include the following controls: firm age, legal status, NACE code, labor share and its square, profitability and its square, export share and its square.

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